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Divergent Gender Revolutions:  
Cohort Changes in Household Financial Management across Income Gradients  
 
Abstract 
The ways in which partners manage their money provide important clues to gender inequality 
in and the nature of couple relationships. Analyzing data from nationally representative 
surveys (N = 11,730 couples), I examine changes across British cohorts born between the 
1920s and 1990s in their household financial management, and how the changes vary across 
individuals and couples occupying differential income positions. The results show divergent, 
nuanced cohort trends toward gender equality in couples’ money management. Across 
successive cohorts of low-earning women, there has been a subtle relaxation in the form of 
male control, reflected in a decrease in the proportion of men adopting “back-seat” 
management by retaining the majority of the couple’s money while delegating the chore of 
managing daily expenses to their partners. By contrast, the empowerment of high-earning 
women is primarily reflected in an individualization of financial management, evident in a 
cohort decrease in joint financial management and an increase in independent management. 
The trend of individualization is particularly prominent among couples in which both 
partners have equally high earnings. The findings provide new insights into and important 
extensions of the theorization of gender relations in and the individualization of couple 
relationships. 
 




Over the past decades, there has been a long march toward gender equality in the public 
sphere, which is reflected in a long-term increase in women’s education and labor force 
participation, a decrease in the gender wage gap, and a rise in women’s economic status 
(England 2010; England, Levine, and Mishel 2020; Gerson 2009; Goldscheider, Bernhardt, 
and Lappegård 2015). By contrast, however, progress toward gender equality lags far behind 
in the domestic sphere (Sullivan, Gershuny, and Robinson 2018). While much research has 
focused on care and housework as the “last bastion” in the gender revolution (e.g., Geist and 
Cohen 2011; Few-Demo and Allen 2020), relatively less attention has been paid to what 
happens to earnings after they enter the household and gender inequality in how partners 
manage their money.1 
Household financial management contains crucial clues to the nature of and inequality in 
couple relationships (Anderson 2017; Bennett 2013; Burgoyne 2004; Pahl 1990; Treas 1993). 
Partners’ decision to pool their money or keep separate purses indicates whether their union 
is built on the foundation of unitary collectivism or represents an association of two 
autonomous individuals (Bennett 2013). Thus, examining household financial management 
puts to test Beck and Beck-Gernsheim’s (2002) individualization thesis, Giddens’ (1992) 
prediction of the decline of the material foundation of late-modern intimacy, and Cherlin’s 
(2010, 2020) theorization of the deinstitutionalization of marriage. Partners’ unequal access 
to money has far-reaching consequences for intra-household inequalities in living standards, 
life satisfaction, and housework division (Hu 2019; Kulic, Minello, and Zella 2020; Lersch 
2017). As such inequalities are often gendered, contestation over money and power in couple 
relationships is a key focus of gender research (Anderson 2017; Kenney 2006; Pepin 2019). 
Despite increasing scholarly interest in intra-household economy and its gender 
inequalities (see Bennett 2013 and Kulic and Dotti Sani 2017 for comprehensive reviews), 
the cohort dynamics of household financial management and its relationship with earnings 
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remain under-studied. This raises two important questions, which I aim to address in this 
research:  
1. How have the ways in which partners manage their money changed across distinct birth 
cohorts? 
2. How do the cohort trends vary over the distributions of partners’ individual, relative, and 
total earnings? 
Answering these questions promises to provide crucial insights into the interplay between 
the gender revolution and the transformation of intimate relationships (Goldscheider, 
Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2015; Sullivan, Gershuny, and Robinson 2018). Has the gender 
revolution fashioned a cohort increase in gender equality in financial management as 
reflected in women’s enhanced access to or autonomy over money in the household? If so, 
what have been the inter-cohort pathways toward gender equality? Across successive cohorts, 
have women’s earnings come to play a more prominent role in bolstering their bargaining 
power and thus control of the couple’s money; or has it given rise to their financial autonomy 
and helped individualize household financial management (cf. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 
2002; Cherlin 2010; Giddens 1992)? Looking through an intersectional lens (Collins and 
Bilge 2020), how do the pathways of cohort change differ between women with low and high 
earnings, and how do they vary with partners’ total earnings?  
To answer these questions, I analyze nationally representative data (N = 11,730 couples) 
from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the United Kingdom Household 
Longitudinal Study (UKHLS). The results uncover divergent cohort trends toward gender 
equality in household financial management across individuals and couples occupying 
differential income positions. While the form of male control has undergone a subtle 
relaxation across successive cohorts of women with low earnings, there has been a cohort 
increase in the proportion of high-earning women who manage their money independently 
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rather than control the couple’s money. The individualization of partners’ money 
management—i.e., a cohort decrease in joint financial management and an increase in 
independent management—is more prominent among high-income individuals and couples 
than their low-income counterparts. The findings provide new insights into and important 
extensions of the theorization of gender relations in and the individualization of couple 
relationships. 
 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Theorizing Systems of Household Financial Management 
This research focuses on couples’ everyday money management. Previous research has 
examined other aspects of household finances, such as savings, debts, and investments 
(Burgoyne 2004; Kan and Laurie 2014; Lersch 2017; Tisch and Lersch 2020; Treas, 1993). I 
do not focus on these aspects, because they are susceptible to diverse mechanisms of 
selection into having savings, debts, and investments (Kan and Laurie 2014). Arguably, all 
couples manage their money on a daily basis (Bennett 2013). Although managing the 
household’s finances does not necessarily equate with absolute control of money 
(Himmelweit et al. 2013; Pahl 1995), financial management plays a crucial role in providing 
partners with the essential access to money and thereby enhancing their financial satisfaction 
and well-being (Elizabeth 2001; Kulic, Minello, and Zella 2020; Lersch 2017). What makes 
money management distinctive, complex, and interesting is its duality—as a means of seizing 
power and as a housekeeping chore (Burgoyne et al. 2007; Hu 2019).  
Existing research has identified four major systems of household financial management 
(Pahl 1995; Pepin 2019; Vogler 1998), which distribute power and responsibilities between 
partners in distinct ways. First, in the joint system, partners pool most or all of their money 
(Kenney 2006; Pahl 1990), which implies that partners not only have equal access to their 
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money, but also share the chore of money management (Pahl 1995). Second, in the 
independent system, partners manage most or all of their money separately (Burgoyne 2004; 
Pahl 1995). Third, in the allowance system, one partner, usually the male, manages the 
couple’s money and gives the other a housekeeping allowance (Vogler 1998). As a 
housekeeping allowance has a designated use, its recipient has little power over the 
household’s finances (Pahl 1995). Finally, in the whole-wage system, one partner manages 
the couple’s money and the other hands over his or her money, retaining a small amount of 
personal spending money (Bisdee, Daly, and Price 2013). Here, a further distinction can be 
made between male whole-wage (i.e., the male partner manages the couple’s money) and 
female whole-wage (i.e., the female partner manages the couple’s money) systems. As 
personal spending money is less restrictive than housekeeping allowance, the partner who 
does not manage the couple’s money has greater power and financial autonomy in the whole-
wage than the allowance system.  
Underlying the different systems are distinct allocative principles, which are theorized 
along two lines. The first line of principles—unity and autonomy—focus on whether partners 
pool their money or keep separate purses. Conceptualizing partners as cooperative social 
actors in a collectivist couple unit (Becker 1991), the norm of unity obliges partners to pool 
their money to foster a sense of solidarity (Pepin 2019; Tisch and Lersch 2020). Money 
pooling is reinforced by the marital institution, as joint management is more common in first 
marriage as opposed to remarriage or unmarried cohabitation, when partners have children, 
and as the duration of a relationship increases (Burgoyne and Morison 1997; Lott 2017; Treas 
1993). Pooling also reduces the transaction cost of transferring money between partners 
(Treas 1993). By contrast, the autonomy principle conceptualizes couplehood as an 
association of two autonomous individuals who retain ownership of their respective money 
(Elizabeth 2001; Pepin 2019).  
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The second line of principles—entitlement, equity, and equality—focus on who manages 
the couple’s money. The entitlement principle allocates the right to money based on ascribed 
characteristics such as gender (Deutsch 1975). Traditional gender ideologies prioritize 
“men’s ‘natural’ right to money” and women’s responsibility in making money (i.e., 
housekeeping allowance) stretch (Nyman 2003, 92). The equity principle allocates rewards 
(i.e., access to money) in proportion to input (i.e., earnings) (Deutsch 1975; Tisch and Lersch 
2020). Reinforcing this principle, the resource-bargaining theory posits that partners’ greater 
contribution to the couple’s earnings enhances their bargaining position in household 
finances (Becker 1991). Under the male-breadwinner norm, however, high-earning women—
particularly those who out-earn their partners—may not benefit from the equity principle; 
rather, they may “perform gender” by relinquishing money management to protect their 
partners’ masculinity (Pahl 1995; West and Zimmerman 1987). The equality principle 
emphasizes “partnership of equals” and, as a result, equal access to the couple’s money 
irrespective of input (Tisch and Lersch 2020; Vogler 2005).  
 
Theorizing and Contextualizing Cohort Changes in Household Financial Management 
The above principles are not immutable but are susceptible to social changes. While 
previous research has provided illuminating snapshots of how couples manage their money 
(e.g., see Bennett 2013 and Kulic and Dotti Sani 2017 for comprehensive reviews; see 
Anderson 2017; Kulic, Minello, and Zella 2020; Lersch 2017; Lott 2017; Tisch and Lersch 
2020; and Pepin 2019 for research published since the reviews), scholars are yet to establish a 
systematic understanding of how, if at all, the systems of household financial management 
have evolved alongside sweeping social changes that demarcate distinct birth cohorts. In this 
section, I provide a theoretical and contextual account of why we might expect the systems 
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and underlying principles of household financial management to vary across cohorts in the 
United Kingdom (UK).  
The last few decades have witnessed dramatic changes in gender ideologies, relations, 
and structures. With the decline of gender essentialism and the rise of gender egalitarianism 
(Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 2011; Scarborough, Sin, and Risman 2019; Scott, 
Crompton, and Lyonette 2010), the entitlement principle may have become less relevant and 
the equality principle may have become more salient in determining how couples manage 
their money. Meanwhile, the progress towards gender equality in the UK, at least in 
education and employment, has outpaced the average progress across the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, which may have helped 
enhance women’s bargaining power in household financial management across cohorts. The 
gender gap in education has reversed in the UK (Klesment and van Bavel 2017), driven by an 
increase in women’s tertiary education participation rate from 24.9% to 55.1% between 1998 
and 2019, compared with 24.3% to 51.3% across the OECD countries (OECD 2020a). The 
employment rate of UK women aged 16–64 increased from 52.8% in 1971 to 72.1% in 2020 
(Office for National Statistics [ONS] 2020), at a speed that far exceeded the OECD average. 
The gender gap in gross hourly wage decreased from 46.4% to 16.0% between 1974 and 
2019, compared with 38.1% to 18.5% in the United States (US) (OECD 2020b).  
The ideological underpinnings and forms of couple relationships have also changed 
considerably. Proponents of the individualization thesis have cast doubt on the economic 
foundation of unitary couple units, arguing that as partners seek to produce their individual 
biographies, intimate relationships have become individualized (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 
2002). In theorizing the rise of “pure relationships,” Giddens (1992) predicted the waning 
importance of economic interdependence between intimate partners. Cherlin (2010, 2020) 
described a shift in the force that binds intimate partners together: from functional exchange 
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to equal companionship, and then to the individualized pursuit of self-growth. Alongside 
these ideological changes, couple relationships have become more diverse. As in the US 
(Cherlin 2020), there has been a long-term rise of unmarried cohabitation and a decline of 
marriage in the UK; and the divorce rate increased from 2.8 to over 14 per thousand married 
people between 1971 and 1993, and then decreased continuously since 1993, due partly to 
plummeting marriage rates (ONS 2018). These trends may have undermined the foundation 
of unitary couplehood and conferred greater marital power upon women (Lewis 2001).    
In the UK, legal, policy, and technological changes may have also helped “individualize” 
couples’ financial management. The UK Family Law builds on an ideology of unitary 
collectivism, holding spouses and civil partners financially liable for each other (Gilmore and 
Glennon 2020). Although assets accumulated during marriage or civil partnership are equally 
divided upon union dissolution, the division of assets in unmarried cohabitation, which has 
become more prevalent across cohorts, is determined by each partner’s contribution (Gilmore 
and Glennon 2020). Meanwhile, the UK’s taxation and welfare systems—e.g., calculation 
and deduction of income tax and welfare payments—have become individualized since the 
1980s (Daly and Scheiwe 2010). Compared with conservative and democratic welfare 
regimes (e.g., Germany and the Scandinavian countries), the liberal welfare regime in the 
UK, as in the US, places a greater emphasis on the individual rather than the family collective 
(Castles et al. 2012). Moreover, an increase in the adoption of internet and mobile banking 
has reduced the transaction costs of independent financial management. In 2019, over 90% of 
people aged 16–34 in Great Britain used internet banking, as opposed to 38% and 18% of 
people aged 75–79 and 80 and over, respectively (ONS 2019). 
The above trends may have promulgated new norms that valorize autonomy and equality 
in couple relationships, while undermining men’s entitlement to money. The cohort increases 
in women’s education, employment, and earnings may have given recent cohorts of women 
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greater power in household finances and created a favorable condition of economic self-
sufficiency for them to keep separate purses (Pahl 2005; Pepin 2019). Thus, these trends may 
have helped individualize household financial management across cohorts, as specified in 
Hypothesis 1A. Moreover, if partners view managing the couple’s money, through the whole-
wage or allowance system, as a means to seize power (Kenny 2006), a cohort increase in 
women’s power in financial management may be reflected in an increase in women’s and a 
decrease in men’s management of the couple’s money, as specified in Hypothesis 1B. 
However, if partners view managing the couple’s money as an onerous chore (Pahl 1995), 
then opposite to Hypothesis 1B, there may be a cohort decrease in the female whole-wage 
system and an increase in the male whole-wage system, as the division of domestic labor 
becomes more gender-egalitarian and more men undertake the chore of managing the 
couple’s money across cohorts (Few-Demo and Allen 2020). 
Hypothesis 1: There has been a cohort decrease in joint financial management and an 
increase in independent management (1A); while the female allowance and male whole-
wage systems have diminished across cohorts, the female whole-wage system has 
become more prevalent (1B). 
 
Theorizing Differential Cohort Changes across Income Gradients 
To further nuance our understanding of cohort changes in household financial 
management through an intersectional lens (Collins and Blige 2020), it is important to 
consider that the changes may have spread unevenly across individuals and couples 
occupying distinct income positions. Partners with differential resources have different 
opportunities and constraints to enact the ideals of gender egalitarianism and individualism in 
daily money management (Nyman 1999; Sung and Bennett 2007). 
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Women with low individual earnings are unlikely to be economically self-sufficient to 
adopt independent financial management, according to the autonomy principle (Pahl 2005; 
Sung and Bennett 2007). Low-income women tend to have low relative earnings vis-à-vis 
their partners.2 According to the equity principle (Deutsch 1975), women with low relative 
earnings are unlikely to develop the bargaining power required to control the couple’s money 
through the female whole-wage system (Tisch and Lersch 2020). Despite these constraints, 
the equality principle provides a viable means for recent cohorts of low-income women to 
access power through joint financial management. As gender equality increasingly extends to 
the division of domestic labor (Few-Demo and Allen 2020) in encouraging men to undertake 
the chore of everyday money management, the female allowance system, which is often 
associated with female housekeeping (Pahl 1995), may have diminished across cohorts of 
low-income women, while the male whole-wage system may have become more prevalent.   
Women with high individual earnings, irrespective of cohort, are unlikely to receive a 
housekeeping allowance (Pahl 1990). Due partly to their high education, recent cohorts of 
high-income women are more likely to endorse the ideology of individualism than their low-
income counterparts (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002); and they are also economically self-
sufficient to be able to afford independent financial management (Himmelweit et al. 2013; 
Pahl 2005). Given a decline of the male-breadwinner norm (Klesment and van Bavel 2017), 
the pressure may have eased for successive cohorts of high-income women, particularly those 
who out-earn their partners, to “perform gender” by relinquishing control of financial 
management to protect their partners’ manhood (Kulic, Minello, and Zella 2020; West and 
Zimmerman 1987). Thus, there might be a decrease in the male whole-wage system across 
cohorts of high-income women. However, there may not be a cohort increase in the female 
whole-wage system among high-income women, because they have the better alternative of 
deriving power from managing their own money independently than undertaking the more 
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onerous chore of managing the couple’s money. The decline of the male-breadwinner norm 
also means that recent cohorts of men may have become less obliged to share their earnings 
with their partners and thus more likely to manage their money independently (Pepin 2019), 
when they have sufficient earnings to support themselves.  
Hypothesis 2: The cohort decrease in joint financial management and increase in 
independent management are greater among high-income than low-income women and 
men (2A); the cohort decrease in the female allowance system and increase in the male 
whole-wage system are greater among low-income than high-income women (2B). 
Furthermore, cohort changes in financial management may vary with partners’ total 
earnings. The economic resources available to a couple affect their ability to individualize 
their finances. While income pooling helps low-income couples to coordinate their 
consumption (Sung and Bennett 2007), high-income couples can afford not to pool (Treas 
1993), partly because the latter tend to have two self-sufficient partners. Compared with low-
income couples, high-income couples are more likely to be free from material concerns to 
prioritize the post-materialist pursuit of individualism and “pure relationships” (Beck and 
Beck-Gernsheim 2002; Giddens 1992), and they are also better able to afford the transaction 
costs arising from independent management (Treas 1993). Existing research shows that 
income pooling is less likely in households with higher income in the US and Sweden 
(Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003) but not in Denmark (Bonke and Uldall-Pulsen 2007).  
Hypothesis 3: The cohort decrease in joint financial management and increase in 
independent management are greater among couples with higher total income than those 
with lower total income. 
We may not expect cohort trends of women’s and men’s management of the couple’s 
money to vary with couple total earnings. On the one hand, gender egalitarianism tends to be 
more closely endorsed by highly educated, affluent couples (Scarborough, Sin, and Risman 
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2019; Scott, Crompton, and Lyonette 2010), which predicts a cohort increase in women’s 
power in financial management among high-income couples. On the other hand, as economic 
necessity increasingly compelled recent cohorts of women in low-income families to 
undertake paid work (Scott, Crompton, and Lyonette 2010), there may have been a cohort 
increase in women’s power in financial management among low-income couples as well. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data and Sample 
I analyzed data from the BHPS and the UKHLS. The BHPS began in 1991 with a 
nationally representative sample of 10,000 individuals aged 16 and over from 5,500 
households, and the respondents were re-interviewed annually until 2008 (Taylor et al. 2010). 
Extra households from Scotland and Wales were added to the panel in 1999, and more from 
Northern Ireland in 2001. The UKHLS was initiated in 2009 as a successor to the BHPS. In 
the first wave, a nationally representative sample of over 50,000 individuals aged 16 and over 
from 30,000 households were interviewed (McFall 2013). They have been re-interviewed 
each year since. The BHPS respondents were absorbed into the UKHLS in its second wave. 
To ensure data comparability over time, I did not use the Northern Ireland panel, as the 
BHPS was originally designed to represent Great Britain.  
The analytical sample was first limited to survey waves with information on household 
financial management—BHPS waves 1–5 (1991–1995) and 15 (2005) and UKHLS waves 4 
(2012–2014) and 8 (2016–2018). I then limited the sample to working-age (25–64) 
respondents who had participated in the main interviews and lived with their partners (N = 
65,317 person–years). As I analyzed information from both partners of a heterosexual couple, 
I deleted 16,760 person–years with no matching partner records, one person–year with 
missing information on gender, and 246 person–years in a same-sex relationship (N = 48,310 
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person–years) and reshaped the data into couple dyads (N = 24,155 couple–years). Then, I 
listwise deleted 1,610 couple–years with invalid or missing information for the variables 
analyzed (N = 22,545 couple–years). As the longitudinal data may over-represent couples 
who stayed together for longer, I kept one random couple–year observation for each couple, 
yielding a final analytical sample of 11,730 couples. See Online Appendix 1 for detailed 
information on sample construction.  
 
Dependent Variable: Household Financial Management 
Individual respondents were asked to describe the management of the household’s 
finances by the two partners. The response categories were as follows: (a) “we share and 
manage our household finances jointly;” (b) “I look after the household’s money except my 
partner’s spending money;” (c) “my partner is given a housekeeping allowance; I look after 
the rest of the money;” (d) “my partner looks after all of the household’s money except my 
personal spending money;” (e) “I am given a housekeeping allowance; my partner looks after 
the rest of the money;” (f) “we pool some of the money and keep the rest separate;” (g) “we 
keep our finances completely separate;” and (h) “I have some other arrangement.” Less than 
1% of couples in which one or both partners had other financial arrangements were deleted 
during data cleaning.   
I recoded the original categories into five systems: joint (category [a] for both genders), 
independent (categories [f] and [g] for both genders), female allowance (category [e] for 
women, [c] for men), male whole-wage (category [d] for women, [b] for men), and female 
whole-wage (categories [b] and [c] for women, [d] and [e] for men). I combined couples who 
managed part (f) or all (g) of their money separately into one system, as only a small number 
of the couples kept their finances completely separate in the earlier cohorts. When partial 
independence was reported (category [f]), it was not clear what exact proportion of their 
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earnings each partner contributed to the joint pool. However, previous research has found that 
the item measuring partial independence is likely to be understood as denoting an essential 
individualism (Hu 2019). As only 97 couples in the sample adopted the male allowance 
system (category [c] for women, [e] for men), I merged this system into the female whole-
wage category, in which female partners manage the couple’s money (Pahl 1995). The 
findings were robust to the exclusion of couples who adopted the male allowance system. 
For the vast majority of couples, both partners provided valid information on their 
financial management, and following Lott (2017), a random response from one partner was 
used to represent a couple. In cases in which one partner failed to provide valid information 
on the measure (N = 354), I used the corresponding valid response from the other partner. As 
partners may provide discrepant information on their financial management, I conducted 
robustness checks using the responses from the female partner, male partner, and both 
partners (i.e., using multilevel models clustering partners’ responses in a couple dyad). These 
alternative specifications yielded substantively consistent results.  
 
Key Predictors 
Birth cohort. I created five dummy variables based on the female partner’s year of birth 
to identify five birth cohorts: ≤1949 (1927–1949), 1950–1959, 1960–1969, 1970–1979, and 
≥1980 (1980–1993). Due to cell size considerations, I was unable to further disaggregate the 
first and last cohorts. An alternative cohort measure based on the male partner’s birth year 
yielded consistent findings. 
Partners’ individual, relative, and total earnings. The survey measured individuals’ 
monthly gross earnings in British pounds. While net earnings may vary with welfare and tax 
arrangements, gross earnings comprehensively measure individuals’ earning power. To 
account for inflation, I adjusted individual earnings to the 2018 value of the pound sterling. I 
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top-coded the measure at the 99th percentile to minimize the influence of outlier cases. I 
calculated relative earnings as the proportion of the couple’s total earnings represented by the 
female partner’s earnings. A couple’s total earnings were calculated by adding up both 
partners’ individual earnings.  
 
Covariates 
As presented in Table 1, I controlled for a range of variables that may confound the role 
played by earnings in moderating cohort changes in financial management. At the individual 
level, I controlled for both partners’ ages and ethnic minority status. I took account of 
whether each partner had obtained a higher education degree. In line with the reversal of the 
gender gap in education (Klesment and van Bavel 2017), a larger proportion of the women 
(37%) than the men (33%) were degree holders. Time spent on paid work may constrain the 
time available for financial management. The survey captured the normal number of weekly 
hours respondents spent on paid work, excluding non-routine overtime and meal breaks, 
using a continuous variable. On average, the women spent fewer hours (M = 19.98) than the 
men (M = 27.76) on paid work. I controlled for whether each partner was in a remarriage 
(Burgoyne and Morison 1997) and whether each partner’s parent(s) co-resided in the 
household.   
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
At the couple level, I distinguished between unmarried cohabiting and married couples 
and controlled for the duration of the current relationship, as household finances tend to 
become more integrated with marriage (Lott 2017) and over time (Treas 1993). As having 
non-adult children in the household affects couples’ resource allocation (Burgoyne et al. 
2007), I also controlled for the number of children who were younger than 16 using a 
categorical variable—none, one, two, and three and above—and the age of the youngest child 
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in the household. As the systems of financial management may differ between small and 
large households, I controlled for household size. Finally, as people’s housing situation 
impinges on their financial strategies, I also distinguished between homeowners (owned 
outright or with a mortgage), social renters, and private renters. 
 
Analytic Strategy 
The analysis was conducted in two steps. I first conducted descriptive analyses to chart 
cohort changes in how partners manage their money. Then, I fitted logit regression models to 
explore how partners’ individual, relative, and total earnings, respectively, moderated cohort 
changes in household financial management. In the models, I used birth cohort, earnings (i.e., 
both partners’ individual earnings, women’s relative earnings and its quadratic term, and 
couple total earnings, respectively), and the interaction of cohort and earnings as the key 
predictors, while controlling for all covariates. In modeling how women’s relative earnings 
moderated the cohort trends, I controlled for couple total earnings; and in modeling the 
moderating role of couple total earnings, I controlled for women’s relative earnings and its 
quadratic term. The difficulty of distinguishing age-period-cohort effects is well documented 
in existing literature (Yang and Land 2013). Following Mishel and colleagues (2020), I 
included respondents’ birth cohort and age, but not survey year (i.e., period), in all models.3 
This means the cohort trends reported here may partly reflect period effects. 
I used multiple binary logit regression models for different systems of financial 
management instead of multinomial logistic regression models, due to smaller cell sizes in 
the latter (Mishel et al. 2020). Nonetheless, alternative multinomial models yielded 
substantively consistent results. While my analytical sample contained non-working 
individuals to capture the full range of partners’ income positions, the results were robust to 
limiting the sample to couples in which both partners were in work. The results were also 
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robust to a more limited sample of couples age 25–54. A variance inflation factor (VIF) test 
showed that all VIFs, apart from those for quadratic terms, were below the threshold of 2.5 
(Li 2013). To provide an intuitive illustration of the results, I graph the conditional 
probabilities of outcome-category membership against the key predictors. The results for the 
full regression models are available in the Online Appendices and those for the robustness 
checks are available upon request from the author.  
 
DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS 
Cohort Changes in Household Financial Management 
Figure 1 presents changes across British cohorts in their household financial 
management. The results partly support Hypothesis 1A, derived from the individualization 
thesis, in showing a gradient cohort increase in the adoption of independent management 
from 2.8% (born ≤ 1949) to 14.6% (born ≥1980). However, the proportion of couples 
managing their money jointly stayed relatively stable across the cohorts. In line with 
Hypothesis 1B predicting a cohort increase in women’s empowerment in household finances, 
male control through the highly restrictive female allowance system diminished from 12.4% 
to 1.8% between the first and last cohorts. However, when it comes to the male and female 
whole-wage systems, the opposite of Hypothesis 1B is observed: while there has been a 
cohort increase in the prevalence of the male whole-wage system from 9.4% to 16.4%, the 
prevalence of the female whole-wage system underwent a gradient decrease across the 
cohorts from 27.9% to 18.8%. This may be because a cohort trend toward a more gender-
egalitarian division of domestic labor has encouraged men in recent cohorts to undertake the 
chore of managing the couple’s money. 




Cohort Differences in Earnings 
Figure 2 describes cohort differences in partners’ individual and relative earnings. The 
individual earnings of both women and men increased across the cohorts, except for the post-
1980 cohort. Compared with their predecessors born 1960–1979, the post-1980 cohort had 
lower individual earnings, partly because they were at an earlier stage in their career. As the 
cohort increase in women’s earnings outpaced that of men, women’s relative contribution to 
the couple’s earnings increased from 31.2% (born ≤ 1949), through 35.6% (born 1950–1959), 
to 38.6% (born 1960–1969), and then the increase slowed down in the last two cohorts. These 
patterns concur with the over-time increase in women’s labor force participation and 
economic standing, as well as the slow-down of the gender revolution over the past three 
decades (England, Levine, and Mishel 2020; Scott, Crompton, and Lyonette 2010).  
 
MULTIVARIATE FINDINGS 
Variations in Cohort Changes with Partners’ Individual Earnings 
Figure 3 shows how cohort changes in financial management vary with partners’ 
individual earnings. The results partly support Hypothesis 2A that there has been a steeper 
cohort decrease in joint management among women and men with high rather than low 
earnings. As shown in the first row of Figure 3, there has hardly been any cohort change in 
the prevalence of joint management at the 5th and 25th percentiles of partners’ individual 
earnings. As we move across to partners with high individual earnings, the more recent 
cohorts have become far less likely to manage their money jointly. For women and men at the 
95th percentile of individual earnings for their respective gender, joint management decreased 
by 17.9 and 12.8 percentage points, respectively, between the first and last cohorts. However, 
the trend of cohort increase in independent management did not vary significantly with 
partners’ individual earnings.  
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[Insert Figure 3 Here] 
The results support Hypothesis 2B that the cohort decrease in the female allowance 
system and cohort increase in the male whole-wage system have both been greater among 
women with lower individual earnings. The prevalence of the female allowance system 
diminished from 24.2% to 2.1% across cohorts of women at the 5th percentile of individual 
earnings, compared with a trend of 2.6% to 0.3% for women at the 95th percentile. 
Meanwhile, the male whole-wage system trended from 8.4% to 26.6% among women at the 
5th percentile of individual earnings, compared with a trend of 7.1% to 12.0% among women 
at the 95th percentile. These results are reverse mirrored by a steeper cohort decrease in the 
female allowance system and a greater increase in the male whole-wage system among men 
with higher individual earnings.  
In line with my earlier theoretical discussion, the cohort trend of the female whole-wage 
system did not vary with partners’ individual earnings. This may be because women with low 
individual earnings across cohorts are consistently hindered by a lack of bargaining power to 
control the couple’s money, whereas women with high individual earnings have resorted to 
alternative means (i.e., independent management) of accessing power in money management. 
 
Variations in Cohort Changes with Women’s Relative Earnings 
Figure 4 depicts the cohort trends of distinct systems of financial management over the 
distribution of women’s relative earnings. In addition to the results for partners’ individual 
earnings, Figure 4 further fleshes out nuanced non-linear relationships between partners’ 
relative earnings and financial management. 
[Insert Figure 4 Here] 
Hypothesis 2A is not supported by the results for joint management, as a statistically 
significant (at the 5% level) cohort decrease in the prevalence of joint management is noted 
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among neither women nor men with high relative earnings (i.e., the two ends of the relative 
income distribution). Rather, as the first row of Figure 4 shows, the cohort decrease is mainly 
observed among partners who contributed more or less equally to the couple’s earnings. 
Combined with the results that women and men with high individual earnings trended away 
from joint financial management across cohorts, the results for relative earnings suggest that 
the cohort decline of unitary couplehood has been most prominent among couples formed of 
two equally high-earning partners. The result also suggests a cohort shift from the equity to 
the equality principle in joint financial management (Deutsch 1975). In the pre-1950 cohort, 
joint management was most likely when partners make more or less equal contributions to 
the couple’s earnings. By contrast, as we move across to the post-1980 cohort, joint 
management has become equally likely across the full distribution of partners’ relative 
earnings, irrespective of input.  
In line with Hypothesis 2A, a cohort increase in independent management is observed 
among both women and men with high relative earnings. Notably, the increase has been 
greater for women with high relative earnings than their male counterparts. Among women 
who were the sole earner (i.e., relative earnings = 1), the prevalence of independent 
management increased from 3.8% to 21.3% between the first and last cohorts, compared with 
an increase from 0.1% to 13.2% among male sole earners (i.e., relative earnings = 0). This 
may be because compared with female sole earners, men who contribute the lion’s share to 
the couple’s earnings are still more likely to be viewed as the breadwinner, despite the 
decline of the male breadwinner norm (Klesment and van Bavel 2017). 
Hypothesis 2B is supported by the results that the cohort decrease in the female 
allowance system and cohort increase in the male whole-wage system are primarily observed 
among women with low rather than high relative earnings. There has hardly been any cohort 
change in the two systems among women with high relative earnings. By contrast, among 
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women who did not make a contribution to the couple’s earnings (i.e., relative earnings = 0), 
the prevalence of the female allowance system decreased from 29.9% to 2.9% and that of the 
male-whole wage system increased from 12.1% to 33.5% between the first and last cohorts.  
The results for the female whole-wage system provide some evidence for the cohort 
decline of “gender performance” in financial management.4 In the pre-1950 cohort, when 
women out-earned their partners, an increase in their relative earnings no longer translated 
into an increase in their likelihood of managing the couple’s money. By comparison, in the 
cohorts born 1950–1979, there was a notable positive association between the women’s 
relative earnings and the adoption of the female whole-wage system. In the post-1980 cohort, 
the strength of the positive association decreased slightly, in part because women with high 
relative earnings in this cohort have turned to independent financial management.    
 
Variations in Cohort Changes with Couple Total Earnings 
Figure 5 presents how cohort changes in household financial management vary with 
couple total earnings. The results partly support Hypothesis 3 that the cohort decrease in joint 
management has been steeper among high-earning than low-earning couples, though the 
cohort trends of independent management varied little with couples’ earnings. Among 
couples at the 95th percentile of partners’ total earnings, the prevalence of joint management 
decreased from 54.1% to 37.0% between the first and last cohorts, compared with hardly any 
cohort change among couples at the 5th percentile. This is consistent with the theoretical 
expectation that compared with low-income couples, high-income couples are more likely to 
enact the ideology of individualism because they are better able to afford not pooling their 
earnings as well as the transaction costs of transferring funds between partners who keep 
separate purses (Sung and Bennett 2007; Treas 1993). In line with the theoretical discussion, 
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couple total earnings do not seem to moderate the cohort trends of the female allowance and 
whole-wage systems.    
 [Insert Figure 5 Here] 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Before discussing the contributions and implications of the findings, it is important to 
briefly consider the limitations of my analysis, which suggest some potential directions for 
future research. First, while I focused on couples’ everyday money management, future 
research could focus on other dimensions of household finances, such as consumption, 
savings, debts, and investments (Burgoyne 2004; Kan and Laurie 2014; Lersch 2017; Pepin 
2019; Tisch and Lersch 2020; Treas 1993). Second, due to the small number of same-sex 
couples in the dataset, I focused on heterosexual couples only; and it remains unclear how 
same-sex couples manage their money. Third, although I analyzed financial unity and 
autonomy as discrete categories, because the survey captured couples’ financial management 
as such, future research could examine financial unity–autonomy using a continuous 
spectrum to distinguish different levels of financial integration and independence between 
partners. Fourth, although this research focused on Great Britain, it is worth extending the 
approach and theoretical insights developed here to other contexts. Finally, future research 
could consider further dimensions of intersectionality such as race and ethnicity.  
 
DISCUSSION 
In this research, I have shown considerable changes across British cohorts born between 
the 1920s and 1990s in how partners managed their money in couple relationships. 
Highlighting the intersectional configuration of the changes (Collins and Bilge 2020), I have 
also shown the nuanced ways in which the cohort trends varied with partners’ individual, 
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relative, and total earnings. In doing so, I have scrutinized two major, intertwining trends 
regarding the transformation of couple relationships—namely the gender revolution 
(England, Levine, and Mishel 2020; Gerson 2009; Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård 
2005) and individualization (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002; Giddens 1992). Bringing 
together these two trends, my findings provide new insights into the role of the gender 
revolution in constituting and shaping the transformation of couplehood.  
 
Divergent Gender Revolutions in Household Financial Management 
Over the past decades, there has been much progress toward gender equality in women’s 
labor force participation, education, and economic standing (England 2010; England, Levine, 
and Mishel 2020). Propelled by several waves of feminist movements, the gender revolution 
has also fashioned a rising tide of gender egalitarianism (Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 
2011; Gerson, 2009; Scarborough, Sin, and Risman 2019). Have these trends parlayed into a 
rise of gender equality in household financial management? While my findings show an 
overall cohort progress toward gender equality in how couples manage their money, they also 
reveal divergent and nuanced gender revolutions in household financial management across 
cohorts of women and couples occupying differential income positions.  
The cohort progress toward gender equality in couples’ money management differed 
considerably between women with low and high individual and relative earnings. Across 
successive cohorts of low-income women, their empowerment in household financial 
management is characterized by a subtle shift in the form of male control from the female 
allowance system to the male whole-wage system. As one has greater freedom in the use of 
personal spending money in the whole-wage system than housekeeping money in the 
allowance system (Pahl 1995), the findings show a nuanced relaxation of financial 
restrictions imposed on low-income women. This trend is accompanied by a cohort decrease 
24 
 
in the proportion of men who have adopted “back-seat” financial management through the 
female allowance system, which allows men to retain the lion’s share of the couple’s money 
and derive power from the money while delegating the onerous chore of managing day-to-
day expenses to their partners. Rather, there has been a cohort increase in the proportion of 
men with low-income partners who have stepped up to embrace the chore of everyday money 
management through the male whole-wage system.  
By contrast, the findings show a considerably different cohort trend of gender 
empowerment in financial management among women with high earnings. This trend is 
characterized by a shift in the women’s role from partaking in household finances through 
joint management (i.e., the pre-1950 cohort) to controlling the couple’s money through the 
female whole-wage system (i.e., cohorts born 1950–1979), and then to controlling their own 
earnings through independent financial management (i.e., the post-1980 cohort). While 
financial management had provided a site at which earlier cohorts of partners construct and 
perform their gender identities (Kulic, Minello, and Zella 2020; Pahl 1995; West and 
Zimmerman 1987), the “gender performance” predicated on the gender essentialist ideal of 
men’s entitlement to money has diminished across cohorts. Compared with their pre-1950 
predecessors, women born between 1950 and 1979 who out-earned their partners have 
become far less likely to “perform femininity” in money management to protect their 
partners’ sense of masculinity. Rather, they have become better able to translate their high 
relative earnings into bargaining power in controlling the couple’s money. With the rise of 
individualism in the post-1980 cohort, however, managing their own money independently 
rather than the couple’s money seems to have provided a more attractive option for high-
earning women. The decline of the male breadwinner norm has also helped fashion a cohort 
increase in the proportion of high-earning men who kept separate purses, as they have 
become less obliged to share their earnings in the family (Pepin 2019).  
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In sum, these findings suggest that there have been plural, divergent, and subtle gender 
revolutions in household financial management. A broad-sweeping cohort trend toward 
gender equality notwithstanding, it is crucial to adopt an intersectional lens to understand the 
ways in which women with differential resources have different opportunities and constraints 
to seek gender empowerment in everyday financial management across cohorts (Collins and 
Bilge 2020).  
 
The Individualization of Household Financial Management  
Eminent social theorists such as Giddens (1992) and Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) 
have predicted a rise of “individualized” and “pure” relationships in late modernity, due 
partly to the spread of gender egalitarianism and post-materialism, a long-term increase in 
women’s education and labor force participation, and a resulting increase in the sense of 
autonomy women derive from their earnings. Cherlin (2010, 2020) similarly argued that 
modern couplehood is increasingly predicated on an association of equal, autonomous 
individuals in pursuit of self-growth rather than economic interdependence. How accurate are 
these arguments, seeing through the lens of money in couple relationships? 
My findings show a cohort trend of individualization in household financial management 
in that the proportion of couples keeping separate purses increased more than five times 
between the pre-1950 and post-1980 cohorts. My findings also show that the cohort decrease 
in joint financial management is most prominent when both partners have equally high 
earnings. While joint financial management was most likely when partners contributed 
equally to the couple’s earnings in earlier cohorts (according to the equity principle), 
partners’ relative contribution to the couple’s earnings has become less relevant in predicting 
the probability of joint management in more recent cohorts (in line with the equality 
principle). Thus, the results suggest a cohort replacement of the equity principle with the 
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equality principle. Moreover, given the economic imperative for low-income couples to 
coordinate their consumption carefully and the transaction costs of transferring funds 
between partners who keep separate purses (Treas 1993), it is not surprising that the cohort 
decrease in joint financial management is observed among high-income rather than low-
income couples.  
Despite the ideals of individualism, autonomy, and “pure relationships” (Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim 2002; Cherlin 2020; Giddens 1992), my findings underline the very material and 
intersectional conditions required for couples to put these ideals to practice. As a result of 
individual partners’ and couples’ differential economic positions, the cohort trend of 
individualization in household financial management is segmented along socioeconomic 
lines. The decline of unitary collectivism and resource bargaining, as well as the rise of the 
ideal of equality in couples’ money management, thus invite scholars to reconsider and revise 
the conceptualization of the family and couplehood as a site of economic exchange, 
cooperation, and contestation (cf. Becker 1991). 
 
Conclusion 
Taken together, my findings indicate that household financial management contains 
crucial and rich clues to changing gender relations in couple relationships. Scholars, 
policymakers, and the general public are gravely concerned about the uneven, stalled, and 
incomplete nature of the gender revolution in the domestic sphere in aspects such as 
household and care work (England, Levine, and Mishel 2020; Gerson 2009; Scarborough et 
al. 2019; Scott, Crompton, and Lyonette 2010). My findings reveal some room for optimism, 
showing some progress toward, but not yet the achievement of, gender equality in how 
couples manage their money. The findings also highlight the importance of an intersectional 
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lens in understanding the divergent trajectories of the gender revolution in household 
finances and the individualization of couple relationships.  
 
NOTES 
1. In this article, “partner” refers to either an unmarried cohabitee or a married spouse in a 
heterosexual relationship. 
2. My examination of partners’ individual, relative, and total earnings provide some insights 
into the nuanced differences between the three in moderating the cohort trends. However, 
given the close correlation between the three measures, I was unable to fully disentangle 
their roles in moderating the cohort trends. To do so would require modeling the 
interactions between the earning variables, which requires a much larger sample to ensure 
sufficient cell sizes for rare cases such as high-earning women who make a low 
contribution to the couple’s earnings.   
3. Although it is possible to model age-period-cohort effects using multilevel models (Yang 
and Land 2013), the number of survey years in my data is too small to estimate period 
effects as higher-level random intercepts.	
4. Critics argued that gender performance in housework may be caused by a lack of 
consideration of women’s individual earnings when modeling the effect of relative 
earnings and the exceptionality of a small fraction of female breadwinners (Sullivan 
2011). However, my additional analyses showed that the results for gender performance 
were robust to including individual earnings instead of couple total earnings and 
excluding women in the top 5 percentile of relative earnings. This may be because most 
previous research has focused on individual-level outcomes (e.g., one’s housework 





Anderson, Nadina L. 2017. To provide and protect: Gendering money in Ukrainian 
households. Gender & Society 31(3):359–382. 
Beck, Ulrich, and Elizabeth Beck-Gernsheim. 2002. Individualization: Institutionalized 
individualism and its social and political consequences. London: SAGE.  
Becker, Gary S. 1991. A Treatise on the family. MA: Harvard University Press.  
Bisdee, Dinah, Tom Daly, and Debora Price. 2013. Behind closed doors: Older couples and 
the gendered management of household money. Social Policy and Society 12(1):163–174. 
Bennett, Fran. 2013. Researching within-household distribution: Overview, developments, 
debates, and methodological challenges. Journal of Marriage and Family 75(3):582–593. 
Bonke, Jens, and Hans Uldall-Poulsen. 2007. Why do families actually pool their income? 
Evidence from Denmark. Review of Economics of the Household 5(2): 113–128. 
Burgoyne, Carole. 2004. Heart-strings and purse-strings: Money in heterosexual marriage. 
Feminism and Psychology 14(1):165–172. 
Burgoyne, Carole, Janet Reibstein, Anne Edmunds, and Valda Dolman. 2007. Money 
management systems in early marriage: Factors influencing change and stability. Journal 
of Economic Psychology 28(2):214–228. 
Burgoyne, Carole B., and Victoria Morison. 1997. Money in remarriage: Keeping things 
simple–and separate. The Sociological Review 45(3): 363–395. 
Castles, Francis G., Stephan Leibfried, Jane Lewis, Herbert Obinger, and Christopher 
Pierson. 2012. The Oxford handbook of the welfare state. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Cherlin, Andrew J. 2010. The marriage-go-round: The state of marriage and the family in 
America today. New York: Vintage. 
Cherlin, Andrew J. 2020. Degrees of change: An assessment of the deinstitutionalization of 
29 
 
marriage thesis. Journal of Marriage and Family 82(1):62–80.  
Collins, Patricia Hill, and Sirma Bilge. 2020. Intersectionality. London: John Wiley & Sons. 
Cotter, David, Joan M. Hermsen, and Reeve Vanneman. 2011. The end of the gender 
revolution? Gender role attitudes from 1977 to 2008. American Journal of 
Sociology 117(1):259–289. 
Daly, Mary, and Kirsten Scheiwe. 2010. Individualisation and personal obligations–social 
policy, family policy, and law reform in Germany and the UK. International Journal of 
Law, Policy and the Family 24(2):177–197. 
Elizabeth, Vivienne. 2001. Managing money, managing coupledom: A critical examination 
of cohabitants’ money management practices. The Sociological Review 49(3):389–411. 
England, Paula. 2010. The gender revolution: Uneven and stalled. Gender & Society 
24(2):149–166.  
England, Paula, Andrew Levine, and Emma Mishel. 2020. Progress toward gender equality in 
the United States has slowed or stalled. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences 117(13):6990–6997. 
Few‐Demo, April L., and Katherine R. Allen. 2020. Gender, feminist, and intersectional 
perspectives on families: A decade in review. Journal of Marriage and 
Family 82(1):326–345. 
Geist, Claudia, and Philip N. Cohen, 2011. Headed toward equality? Housework change in 
comparative perspective. Journal of Marriage and Family 73(4):832–844. 
Gerson, Kathleen. 2009. The unfinished revolution: Coming of age in a new era of gender, 
work, and family. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Giddens, Anthony. 1992. The transformation of intimacy: Sexuality, love, and eroticism in 
modern societies. CA: Stanford University Press. 
30 
 
Gilmore, Stephen, and Lisa Glennon. 2020. Hayes and Williams’ family law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Goldscheider, Frances, Eva Bernhardt, and Trude Lappegård. 2015. The gender revolution: A 
framework for understanding changing family and demographic behavior. Population 
and Development Review 41(2):207–239. 
Heimdal, Kirsten R., and Sharon K. Houseknecht. 2003. Cohabiting and married couples’ 
income organization: Approaches in Sweden and the United States. Journal of Marriage 
and Family 65(3):525–538. 
Himmelweit, Susan, Cirstina Santos, Almudena Sevilla, and Catherine Sofer. 2013. Sharing 
of resources within the family and the economics of household decision making. Journal 
of Marriage and Family 75(3):625–639. 
Hu, Yang. 2019. What about money? Earnings, household financial organization, and 
housework. Journal of Marriage and Family 81(5):1091–1109.  
Kan, Man-Yee, and Heather Laurie. 2014. Changing patterns in the allocation of savings, 
investments and debts within couple relationships. The Sociological Review 62(2):335–
358.  
Kenney, Catherine T. 2006. The power of the purse: Allocative systems and inequality in 
couple households. Gender & Society 20(3):354–381.  
Klesment, Martin, and Jan van Bavel. 2017. The reversal of the gender gap in education, 
motherhood, and women as main earners in Europe. European Sociological 
Review 33(3):465–481. 
Kulic, Nevana, Alessandra Minello, and Sara Zella. 2020. Manage your money, be satisfied? 
Money management practices and financial satisfaction of couples through the lens of 
gender. Journal of Family Issues 41(9):1420–1446. 
Kulic, Nevana, and Guilia M. Dotti Sani. 2017. Intra-household sharing of financial 
31 
 
resources: A review. European University Institute Max Weber Programme working 
paper MWP 2017/12. Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/46817  
Lersch, Philipp M. 2017. Individual wealth and subjective financial well‐being in marriage: 
Resource integration or separation? Journal of Marriage and Family 79(5):1211–1223. 
Lewis, Jane. 2001. The end of marriage? Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
Li, Cheng. 2013. Little’s test of missing completely at random. The Stata Journal 13(4):795–
809. 
Lott, Yvonne. 2017. When my money becomes our money: Changes in couples’ money 
management. Social Policy and Society 16(2):199–218. 
Mishel, Emma, Paula England, Jessie Ford, and Mónica L. Caudillo. 2020. Cohort increases 
in sex with same-sex partners: Do trends vary by gender, race, and class? Gender & 
Society 34(2):178–209. 
Nyman, Charlott. 1999. Gender equality in ‘the most equal country in the world’? Money and 
marriage in Sweden. The Sociological Review 47(4):766–793. 
OECD. 2020a. Population with tertiary education. Available at: 
https://data.oecd.org/eduatt/population-with-tertiary-education.htm 
OECD. 2020b. Gender wage gap. Available at: https://data.oecd.org/earnwage/gender-wage-
gap.htm 
ONS. 2018. Divorces in England and Wales. Available at:  www.ons.gov.uk/ 
peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/divorce/bulletins/divorcesinen
glandandwales/2018 
ONS. 2019. Internet banking, by age group, Great Britain, 2019. Available at: 
www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/householdcharacteristics/homeinternet
andsocialmediausage/adhocs/10822internetbankingbyagegroupgreatbritain2019 





Pahl, Jan. 1990. Household spending, personal spending, and the control of money in 
marriage. Sociology 24(1):119–138. 
Pahl, Jan. 1995. His money, her money: Recent research on financial organization in 
marriage. Journal of Economic Psychology 16(3):361–376.  
Pahl, Jan. 2005. Individualisation in couple finances: who pays for the children? Social 
Policy and Society 4(4):381–391. 
Pepin, Joanna R. 2019. Beliefs about money in families: Balancing unity, autonomy, and 
gender equality. Journal of Marriage and Family 81(2):361–379.  
Scarborough, William J., Ray Sin, and Babara Risman. 2019. Attitudes and the stalled gender 
revolution: Egalitarianism, traditionalism, and ambivalence from 1977 through 2016. 
Gender & Society 33(2):173–200. 
Scott, Jacqueline L., Rosemary Crompton, and Clare Lyonette. 2010. Gender inequalities in 
the 21st century: New barriers and continuing constraints. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
Sullivan, Oriel. 2011. An end to gender display through the performance of housework? A 
review and reassessment of the quantitative literature using insights from the qualitative 
literature. Journal of Family Theory and Review 3(1):1–13.  
Sullivan, Oriel, Jonathan Gershuny, and John P. Robinson. 2018. Stalled or uneven gender 
revolution? A long‐term processual framework for understanding why change is 
slow. Journal of Family Theory & Review 10(1):263–279. 
Sung, Sirin, and Fran Bennett. 2007. Dealing with money in low-moderate income couples: 
Insights from individual interviews. In Social policy review 19: Analysis and debate in 




Taylor, Marcia Freed, John Brice, Nick Buck, and Elaine Prentice-Lane. 2010. British 
Household Panel Survey user manual. Colchester: University of Essex.  
Tisch, Daria, and Philipp M. Lersch. 2020. Distributive justice in marriage: Experimental 
evidence on beliefs about fair savings arrangements. Journal of Marriage and Family. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/jomf.12694 
Treas, Judith. 1993. Money in the bank: Transaction costs and the economic organization of 
marriage. American Sociological Review 58(5):723–734.  
Vogler, Carolyn. 2005. Cohabiting couples: Rethinking money in the household at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. The Sociological Review 53(1):1–29.  
West, Candace, and Don H. Zimmerman. 1987. Doing gender. Gender & Society 1(2):125–
151.  
Yang, Yang, and Kenneth C. Land. 2013. Age-period-cohort analysis: New models, methods, 




FIGURE 1:  Cohort Changes in Systems of Household Financial Management 
NOTE: N = 11,730 couples. Birth cohorts are classified based on the female partner’s year of birth, and 
alternative classification based on the male partner’s year of birth yielded consistent results. Numbers in italics 
are statistically different at the 5% or below from the corresponding numbers for the preceding cohort based on 
chi-squared tests.  




FIGURE 2:  Partners’ Individual and Relative Earnings, by Birth Cohort 
NOTE: N = 11,730 couples. Numbers at the end of the darker bars indicate the percentage of the couple’s 
earnings represented by the female partner’s earnings. Earnings measured in British pound sterling, which are 
adjusted to the 2018 value to account for inflation; and 1 British pound ≈ 1.35 US dollars in 2018. Birth cohorts 
are classified based on the female partner’s year of birth, and alternative classification based on the male 
partner’s year of birth yielded consistent results. All gender differences are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Numbers in italics are statistically different at the 5% or below from the corresponding numbers for the 
preceding cohort based on two-tailed t-tests.   
  
 
FIGURE 3:  Predicted Cohort Changes in Household Financial Management, by 
Percentile Rank of Women’s and Men’s Individual Earnings 
NOTE: N = 11,730 couples. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Calculations are based on Models 1–5 
presented in Online Appendix 2, holding all covariates at their observed values. Percentile ranks of individual 
earnings calculated separately for women and men. Birth cohorts are classified based on the female partner’s 
year of birth, and alternative classification based on the male partner’s year of birth yielded consistent results.    
 
FIGURE 4:  Predicted Probability of Household Financial Management over the 
Distribution of Women’s Relative Earnings, by Birth Cohort 
NOTE: N = 11,730 couples. Gray bands indicate 95% confidence intervals. Calculations are based on Models 
6–10 presented in Online Appendix 3, holding all covariates at their observed values. Birth cohorts are classified 
based on the female partner’s year of birth, and alternative classification based on the male partner’s year of 
birth yielded consistent results.   
  
 
FIGURE 5:  Predicted Cohort Changes in Household Financial Management, by 
Percentile Rank of Couple Total Earnings  
NOTE: N = 11,730 couples. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Calculations are based on Models 11–
15 presented in Online Appendix 4, holding all covariates at their observed values. Birth cohorts are classified 
based on the female partner’s year of birth, and alternative classification based on the male partner’s year of 
birth yielded consistent results. 
  
TABLE 1:  Sample Characteristics 
   Women  Men 
Characteristic Minimum Maximum 
Mean 
/Proportion SD  
Mean 
/Proportion SD 
Individual level        
Individual earnings (£1,000) a b 0 12.09 1.70 1.40 
 
2.94 2.03 
(Median)   (1.39)   (2.54)  
Relative earnings a 0 1 0.38 0.24 
 
0.62 0.24 
Age a 25 64 42.19 9.94 
 
44.46 10.01 
Ethnic minority 0 1 0.14   0.13  
Higher education degree  0 1 0.37   0.33  
Weekly paid work time (hour) a b 0 60 19.98 16.00 
 
27.76 18.42 
Remarried  0 1 0.17   0.16  
Co-residing parent(s) 0 1 0.01   0.01  
Couple level   
     
Birth cohort        
≤	1949 0 1 0.10   –  
1950–1959  0 1 0.18   –  
1960–1969 0 1 0.30   –  
1970–1979 0 1 0.26   –  
≥ 1980 0 1 0.17   –  
Couple total earnings (£1,000) a b 0 15.89 4.65 2.66  –  
(Median)   (4.12)     




Relationship duration (year) 0 41 13.29 10.74  –  
Number of children in household    
     
0 0 1 0.47   –  
1 0 1 0.21   –  
2 0 1 0.23   –  
≥ 3 0 1 0.10   –  
Age of youngest child in household c 0 15 6.17 4.65  –  
Household size   3.44 1.22  –  
Housing tenure        
Owner 0 1 0.78   –  
Social renter 0 1 0.13   –  
Private renter 0 1 0.10   –  
NOTE: N = 11,730 couples. For dummy variables, 0 = No and 1 = Yes. SD = standard deviation. Mean values 
reported for continuous variables and proportions reported for dummy variables. Column proportions may not 
add up to 1 due to rounding. All earnings measures are adjusted to the 2018 value of British pounds to account 
for inflation; and 1 British pound ≈ 1.35 US dollars in 2018. Birth cohorts are classified based on the female 
partner’s year of birth, and alternative classification based on the male partner’s year of birth yielded consistent 
results.   
a Gender difference significant at the 1‰ level and below, based on chi-squared test for categorical variables 
and two-tailed t-test for continuous variables. b Top-coded at the 99th percentiles to reduce the influence of 
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Appendix 1:  Steps of Sample Selection 
Step Sample elimination Remaining sample 
0 – Initial full sample 
N = 149,909 person–years with valid individual 
and household records:  
• BHPS waves 1–5 & 15, N = 10,264 (1991), 
9,845 (1992), 9,600 (1993), 9,481 (1994), 
9,249 (1995), 15,617 (2005) 
• UKHLS waves 4 and 8, N = 47,071 (2012–
14), 38,782 (2016–18). 
1 –8,342 person–years from Northern Ireland N = 141,567 person–years 
2 –8,437 proxy person–years N = 133,130 person–years 
3 –49,007 person–years of singletons and those not living 
with their partners 
N = 84,123 person–years 
4 –18,806 person–years age < 25 and > 64 N = 65,317 person–years 
5 –1 missing information for sex N = 65,316 person–years 
6 –16,760 no corresponding partner ID/record N = 48,556 person–years 
7 –246 person–years as part of a same-sex couple N = 48,310 person–years 
8 Reshape individual-level data into couple dyads N = 24,155 couple–years 
9 Listwise deletion of 1,610 couple–years with missing 
information following the order below:  
• 103 financial management missing or “other” for 
both partners  
• 360 education missing for either partner  
• 33 individual earnings missing for either partner  
• 191 weekly paid work hours missing for either 
partner 
• 421 ethnic status missing for either partner 
• 462 relationship history missing for either partner 
• 40 housing tenure missing	
N = 22,545 couple–years  
10 Randomly select 1 couple–year observation for each 
couple 
Final analytical sample 
N = 11,730 couples 
  
Appendix 2:  Logit Regression Models Estimating the Interaction Effects of Birth Cohort 
and Partners’ Individual Earnings in Predicting Household Financial Management (for 
Figure 3) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 






Predictors B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Birth cohort (ref. = ≤ 1949)      
1950–1959  0.16 1.74*** –1.13*** 0.53* –0.20 
 (0.15) (0.43) (0.28) (0.24) (0.17) 
1960–1969 0.10 2.15*** –2.29*** 0.82*** –0.09 
 (0.14) (0.42) (0.29) (0.22) (0.16) 
1970–1979 0.06 2.55*** –2.31*** 1.20*** –0.24 
 (0.15) (0.43) (0.34) (0.24) (0.17) 
≥ 1980 0.16 3.00*** –2.96*** 1.28*** –0.30 
 (0.17) (0.45) (0.45) (0.26) (0.21) 
Women’s earnings (£1,000)  0.14* 0.53*** –0.61*** –0.04 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.12) (0.15) (0.10) (0.07) 
Women’s earnings ´ cohort  
(ref. = ≤ 1949) 
     
1950–1959 –0.12 –0.37** 0.06 –0.08 0.03 
 (0.07) (0.13) (0.19) (0.11) (0.08) 
1960–1969 –0.16** –0.37** 0.38* –0.14 0.01 
 (0.06) (0.13) (0.16) (0.10) (0.07) 
1970–1979 –0.20** –0.33* 0.14 –0.20 0.07 
 (0.06) (0.13) (0.18) (0.11) (0.07) 
≥ 1980 –0.17* –0.40** 0.14 –0.20 0.04 
 (0.07) (0.13) (0.25) (0.11) (0.08) 
Men’s earnings (£1,000)  –0.02 0.06 0.09 0.14** –0.14** 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Men’s earnings ´ cohort  
(ref. = ≤ 1949) 
     
1950–1959 0.01 –0.05 0.01 –0.01 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
1960–1969 0.02 –0.03 0.04 –0.02 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
1970–1979 –0.01 –0.02 0.03 –0.01 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
≥ 1980 –0.06 –0.02 0.04 0.05 –0.06 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) 
      
Women’s age –0.01 0.05*** –0.05*** 0.01 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Men’s age –0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 –0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Women ethnic minority (ref. = no) –0.03 –0.05 0.23 0.36** –0.36** 
 (0.09) (0.14) (0.26) (0.12) (0.12) 
Men ethnic minority (ref. = no) 0.11 –0.13 0.05 0.17 –0.26* 
 (0.09) (0.14) (0.26) (0.13) (0.12) 
Women degree holder (ref. = no) 0.12** 0.20** –0.28* –0.31*** –0.03 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.14) (0.07) (0.06) 
Men degree holder (ref. = no) 0.10* 0.31*** 0.21 0.04 –0.40*** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.12) (0.07) (0.06) 
Women’s weekly paid work hours 0.01*** 0.01*** –0.02*** –0.01** –0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Men’s weekly paid work hours 0.00 0.00 –0.00 –0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Women’s parent(s) co-residing  –0.06 0.50 –0.26 –0.55 0.19 
(ref. = no) (0.18) (0.29) (0.53) (0.32) (0.21) 
Men’s parent(s) co-residing  –0.05 –0.02 0.38 0.10 –0.22 
(ref. = no) (0.17) (0.34) (0.40) (0.21) (0.24) 
Women remarried (ref. = no) –0.07 0.24** –0.01 –0.10 0.02 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.15) (0.08) (0.06) 
Men remarried (ref. = no) –0.01 –0.09 0.21 0.01 –0.02 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.15) (0.08) (0.07) 
Married (ref. = cohabiting) 0.23*** –0.82*** –0.14 0.26** 0.11 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.17) (0.08) (0.06) 
Relationship duration (year) 0.01** –0.04*** 0.02* –0.01 0.01* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Number of children (ref. = 0)      
1 –0.03 –0.03 0.36 –0.21 0.25* 
 (0.08) (0.13) (0.24) (0.12) (0.10) 
2 –0.06 –0.11 0.56* –0.21 0.30** 
 (0.08) (0.15) (0.24) (0.12) (0.10) 
≥ 3 –0.00 –0.15 0.72* –0.42** 0.31* 
 (0.11) (0.22) (0.29) (0.16) (0.13) 
Age of youngest child 0.01 –0.02 –0.01 0.00 –0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Household size 0.00 –0.13** –0.02 0.03 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) 
Housing tenure (ref. = owner)      
Social renter 0.02 –0.48*** –0.36* –0.49*** 0.45*** 
 (0.06) (0.13) (0.16) (0.10) (0.07) 
Private renter 0.08 –0.15 –0.10 –0.04 –0.01 
 (0.07) (0.11) (0.20) (0.10) (0.08) 
Intercept 0.04 –6.09*** 0.10 –3.42*** –0.99*** 
 (0.21) (0.51) (0.54) (0.34) (0.25) 
Pseudo R2 0.008 0.123 0.143 0.046 0.037 
NOTE: N = 11,730 couples. Ref. = reference category.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). 
 
  
Appendix 3:  Logit Regression Models Estimating the Interaction Effects of Birth Cohort 
and Women’s Relative Earnings in Predicting Household Financial Management (for Figure 
4) 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 






Predictors B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Birth cohort (ref. = ≤ 1949)      
1950–1959  0.36* 1.59* –1.25*** 0.34 –0.01 
 (0.18) (0.70) (0.26) (0.24) (0.20) 
1960–1969 0.35* 2.05** –1.86*** 0.63** 0.00 
 (0.17) (0.67) (0.27) (0.23) (0.19) 
1970–1979 0.04 2.24** –2.00*** 1.24*** –0.08 
 (0.18) (0.68) (0.29) (0.24) (0.21) 
≥ 1980 0.19 3.15*** –2.77*** 1.33*** –0.53* 
 (0.20) (0.69) (0.39) (0.26) (0.25) 
Women’s relative earnings  3.20*** 5.32 –4.78*** –3.29** 1.33 
 (0.76) (2.83) (1.20) (1.18) (0.83) 
Women’s relative earnings ´ cohort  
(ref. = ≤ 1949) 
     
1950–1959  –1.79 –2.55 2.10 1.71 –1.10 
 (0.94) (3.09) (1.81) (1.45) (1.06) 
1960–1969 –2.08* –2.48 0.41 1.36 –1.14 
 (0.87) (2.95) (1.72) (1.34) (0.97) 
1970–1979 –1.61 –1.06 –0.42 –0.34 –0.98 
 (0.89) (2.97) (1.76) (1.33) (1.00) 
≥ 1980 –2.54** –3.92 1.14 0.79 0.10 
 (0.95) (2.98) (2.38) (1.40) (1.14) 
Women’s relative earnings2  –3.19*** –3.61 3.40* 3.35* –0.77 
 (0.88) (2.89) (1.48) (1.36) (0.95) 
Women’s relative earnings2 ´ cohort  
(ref. = ≤ 1949) 
     
1950–1959  1.66 1.54 –3.02 –2.89 1.52 
 (1.07) (3.16) (2.46) (1.69) (1.18) 
1960–1969 1.84 1.41 –0.56 –2.78 1.64 
 (0.99) (3.01) (2.15) (1.55) (1.08) 
1970–1979 1.39 0.20 0.23 –1.15 1.57 
 (1.01) (3.03) (2.19) (1.53) (1.11) 
≥ 1980 2.63* 2.84 –1.99 –2.29 0.25 
 (1.07) (3.06) (3.25) (1.63) (1.24) 
Couple total earnings (£1,000) –0.02* 0.09*** 0.00 0.03** –0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Women’s age –0.01 0.05*** –0.05*** 0.01 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Men’s age –0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 –0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Women ethnic minority (ref. = no) –0.02 –0.03 0.21 0.35** –0.36** 
 (0.09) (0.14) (0.26) (0.12) (0.12) 
Men ethnic minority (ref. = no) 0.11 –0.14 0.04 0.17 –0.26* 
 (0.09) (0.14) (0.27) (0.12) (0.12) 
Women degree holder (ref. = no) 0.13** 0.20** –0.31* –0.34*** –0.03 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.14) (0.07) (0.05) 
Men degree holder (ref. = no) 0.11* 0.32*** 0.19 0.04 –0.42*** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.12) (0.07) (0.06) 
Women’s weekly paid work hours 0.00* 0.00 –0.02*** –0.00 –0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Men’s weekly paid work hours –0.00 0.00 –0.00 –0.00* 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Women’s parent(s) co-residing  –0.07 0.50 –0.17 –0.55 0.18 
(ref. = no) (0.18) (0.29) (0.53) (0.33) (0.21) 
Men’s parent(s) co-residing  –0.04 –0.01 0.41 0.10 –0.22 
(ref. = no) (0.17) (0.34) (0.40) (0.21) (0.24) 
Women remarried (ref. = no) –0.07 0.23** –0.01 –0.08 0.02 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.15) (0.08) (0.06) 
Men remarried (ref. = no) –0.01 –0.09 0.21 –0.00 –0.02 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.15) (0.08) (0.07) 
Married (ref. = cohabiting) 0.23*** –0.81*** –0.16 0.25** 0.11 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.17) (0.08) (0.06) 
Relationship duration (year) 0.01** –0.04*** 0.02* –0.01 0.01* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Number of children (ref. = 0)      
1 –0.03 –0.02 0.35 –0.20 0.25** 
 (0.08) (0.13) (0.23) (0.12) (0.10) 
2 –0.06 –0.09 0.59* –0.19 0.30** 
 (0.08) (0.15) (0.24) (0.12) (0.10) 
≥ 3 –0.01 –0.15 0.76** –0.40* 0.30* 
 (0.11) (0.22) (0.29) (0.16) (0.13) 
Age of youngest child 0.01* –0.02 –0.01 0.01 –0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Household size 0.00 –0.14** –0.01 0.03 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) 
Housing tenure (ref. = owner)      
Social renter 0.01 –0.52*** –0.33* –0.47*** 0.46*** 
 (0.06) (0.13) (0.17) (0.10) (0.07) 
Private renter 0.09 –0.16 –0.10 –0.03 –0.00 
 (0.07) (0.11) (0.20) (0.10) (0.08) 
Intercept –0.23 –6.60*** 0.53 –2.82*** –1.38*** 
 (0.22) (0.71) (0.53) (0.33) (0.26) 
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.125 0.145 0.046 0.038 
NOTE: N = 11,730 couples. Ref. = reference category.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). 
 
  
Appendix 4:  Logit Regression Models Estimating the Interaction Effects of Birth Cohort 
and Couple Total Earnings in Predicting Household Financial Management (for Figure 5) 
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 






Predictors B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Birth cohort (ref. = ≤ 1949)      
1950–1959  0.13 1.57*** –1.08*** 0.61** –0.24 
 (0.14) (0.40) (0.27) (0.23) (0.17) 
1960–1969 0.07 1.96*** –2.11*** 0.96*** –0.17 
 (0.14) (0.39) (0.28) (0.22) (0.16) 
1970–1979 0.02 2.33*** –2.24*** 1.34*** –0.33 
 (0.15) (0.40) (0.32) (0.23) (0.17) 
≥ 1980 0.13 2.77*** –2.89*** 1.41*** –0.40 
 (0.17) (0.42) (0.43) (0.26) (0.21) 
Couple total earnings (£1,000)  0.02 0.20*** –0.03 0.09* –0.08* 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Couple total earnings ´ cohort  
(ref. = ≤ 1949) 
     
1950–1959  –0.02 –0.14* 0.01 –0.04 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) 
1960–1969 –0.03 –0.13* 0.07 –0.07 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
1970–1979 –0.06* –0.10 0.04 –0.08 0.05 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
≥ 1980 –0.08* –0.13 0.04 –0.04 –0.01 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05) (0.04) 
Women’s relative earnings  1.46*** 3.03*** –4.27*** –2.53*** 0.50 
 (0.28) (0.55) (0.72) (0.40) (0.33) 
Women’s relative earnings2 –1.60*** –2.30*** 2.62** 1.27** 0.50 
 (0.29) (0.54) (0.85) (0.44) (0.33) 
Women’s age –0.01 0.05*** –0.05*** 0.01 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Men’s age –0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 –0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Women ethnic minority (ref. = no) –0.02 –0.03 0.21 0.35** –0.36** 
 (0.09) (0.14) (0.26) (0.12) (0.12) 
Men ethnic minority (ref. = no) 0.11 –0.13 0.06 0.16 –0.26* 
 (0.09) (0.14) (0.27) (0.12) (0.12) 
Women degree holder (ref. = no) 0.13** 0.20** –0.32* –0.33*** –0.03 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.14) (0.07) (0.05) 
Men degree holder (ref. = no) 0.11* 0.32*** 0.19 0.04 –0.42*** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) 
Women’s weekly paid work hours 0.00* 0.00 –0.02*** –0.00 –0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Men’s weekly paid work hours –0.00 0.00 –0.00 –0.00* 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Women’s parent(s) co-residing  –0.07 0.50 –0.20 –0.53 0.18 
(ref. = no) (0.18) (0.29) (0.53) (0.33) (0.21) 
Men’s parent(s) co-residing  –0.04 –0.01 0.40 0.12 –0.23 
(ref. = no) (0.17) (0.34) (0.40) (0.21) (0.24) 
Women remarried (ref. = no) –0.07 0.23* –0.00 –0.09 0.02 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.15) (0.08) (0.06) 
Men remarried (ref. = no) –0.00 –0.09 0.21 0.00 –0.02 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.15) (0.08) (0.07) 
Married (ref. = cohabiting) 0.24*** –0.81*** –0.16 0.26** 0.11 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.17) (0.08) (0.06) 
Relationship duration (year) 0.01** –0.04*** 0.02* –0.01 0.01* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Number of children (ref. = 0)      
1 –0.02 –0.01 0.35 –0.19 0.25* 
 (0.08) (0.13) (0.23) (0.12) (0.10) 
2 –0.05 –0.09 0.59* –0.17 0.28** 
 (0.08) (0.15) (0.24) (0.12) (0.10) 
≥ 3 –0.00 –0.14 0.76** –0.36* 0.28* 
 (0.11) (0.22) (0.29) (0.16) (0.13) 
Age of youngest child 0.01 –0.02 –0.01 0.00 –0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Household size 0.00 –0.14** –0.01 0.03 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) 
Housing tenure (ref. = owner)      
Social renter 0.00 –0.51*** –0.33* –0.47*** 0.45*** 
 (0.06) (0.13) (0.17) (0.10) (0.07) 
Private renter 0.08 –0.16 –0.10 –0.03 –0.00 
 (0.07) (0.11) (0.20) (0.10) (0.08) 
Intercept –0.07 –6.53*** 0.67 –3.05*** –1.23*** 
 (0.21) (0.50) (0.54) (0.34) (0.25) 
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.125 0.145 0.045 0.038 
NOTE: N = 11,730 couples. Ref. = reference category.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). 
 
 
	
